Churchill Stalin Roosevelt Agreement

Churchill`s books on the history of the Second World War were written as much to influence the present as to understand the past. In the 1950s, Churchill was obsessed with the possibility of nuclear war and wanted to find a way to defuse the Cold War before it turned into a third world war that he believed to be the end of humanity. One of the main themes of later volumes in the history of the Second World War was that it was possible to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union. Faced with these concerns, Churchill presented the percentage agreement as a triumph of state art, with the obvious consequence that it was the solution for the Cold War, with Western powers and the Soviet Union declaring themselves ready to respect each other`s spheres of influence. [86] In an interview with CL Sulzberger in 1956, Churchill said that most historians think the agreement is very important. In The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Norman Naimark writes that, with the Yalta and Potsdam accords, “the famous percentage agreement between Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill… confirms that Eastern Europe, at least initially, would be within the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. [72] Churchill defended his action in Yalta during a three-day parliamentary debate that began on February 27 and ended with a vote of confidence. During the debate, many MPs criticized Churchill and expressed deep reservations about Yalta and his support for Poland, 25 of whom drafted an amendment to protest the agreement. [22] It was not until 1958 that Soviet historians recognized Churchill`s account in triumph and tragedy and denied it only to deny it. [69] Soviet diplomat Igor Zemskov wrote in the historical journal Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn that Churchill`s assertion of a percentage agreement was a baseless “sordid and rude” lie and said that Stalin had not made such an offer that it would have refused if it had been made. [69] The accusation that Stalin coldly and cynically abandoned the EAM, which was able to retake all of Greece in October 1944, proved damaging to his reputation in left-wing circles. Some historians, including Gabriel Kolko and Geoffrey Roberts, believe that the importance of the agreement is overstated. [70] Kolko writes that the final agreement provided that “the provisional government, which is currently working in Poland, should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis, including Polish and Polish democratic leaders abroad.” [18] Yalta`s language recognized the supremacy of the pro-Soviet Lublin government in a provisional government, albeit a reorganized one.

[19] On May 4, 1944, Churchill asked his foreign minister, Anthony Eden, the rhetorical question: “Will we agree with the communitarianization of the Balkans and perhaps Italy?” [26] Churchill answered his own question by saying that Britain must “resist communist infusion and invasion.” [26] The attempt to gain spheres of influence for the Balkans has led Gusev to question whether the Americans would be involved. [26] Eden assured Gusev that the Americans would support the spheres of influence of the agreement, but on request, the State Department responded firmly that it was not the policy of the United States to conclude such agreements as would violate the Atlantic Charter. [26] Churchill found himself in a difficult situation and spoke directly to Roosevelt.

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